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EVER BETTER SITUATIONS AND THE FAILURE  
OF EXPRESSION PRINCIPLES
Dean Zimmerman
William Rowe argues that if an omnipotent, omniscient being were faced with 
an infinite hierarchy of better and better worlds to create, that being could not 
also be unsurpassably morally excellent. His argument assumes that, at least 
in ideal circumstances, degree of moral goodness must be perfectly expressed 
in the degree of goodness of the outcomes chosen. Reflection upon the appli-
cation of analogous expression principles for certainty and desire shows that 
such principles can be expected to fail for anyone capable of facing an infinite 
range of options.
Rowe’s Argument
William Rowe has argued that if an omnipotent, omniscient being were 
faced with an infinite hierarchy of better and better worlds to create, that 
being could not also be unsurpassably morally excellent.1 The argument 
relies crucially upon Rowe’s principle B.
B: If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world it 
could have created, then it is possible that there exist a being morally 
better than it.2
This is backed up by the intuitive thought that: in general, someone willing 
to settle for a less good outcome, other things being equal, is morally infe-
rior to someone who has higher standards.3
Here is my reconstruction of Rowe’s argument:
1. For any x and W: if x is all-powerful and all-knowing in W, and 
there is no maximum to the goodness of the worlds available to x, 
then x could have ensured the existence of a better world than W.
1Rowe, “The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom,” “The Problem of No Best 
World,” and “Can God Be Free?”; the fullest presentation is in Rowe, Can God Be Free?, Ch. 
6. The core argument was also stated succinctly in a one-page 1988 article by Stephen Grover 
(“Why Only the Best is Good Enough”). 
2Rowe, Can God Be Free?, 91.
3Rowe, Can God Be Free?, 100–101.
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2. For any x and W: if x, in W, could have ensured the existence of a 
better world than W, then W is a possible world in which x is not as 
good as x could have been. [Implication of Rowe’s Principle B]
3. So, for any x and W: if x is all-powerful and all-knowing in W, and 
there is no maximum to the goodness of worlds, then W is a world 
in which x is not as good as x could have been. [From 1 & 2]
4. There is no possible world W in which God exists but is not as good 
as God is in some other world W*—nor is there any world in which 
any other being is better than God is in W. [Moral Unsurpassability]
5. So, for any W: if there is no maximum to the goodness of worlds, 
then, if God exists in W, God is not all-powerful and all-knowing in 
W. [From 3 & 4]
6. There is no possible world in which God exists but is not all-powerful 
and all-knowing. [Essentiality of Omnipotence and Omniscience]
 So, for any W: if there is no maximum to the goodness of worlds, 
then God does not exist in W. [From 5 & 6]
Which is to say, if there is no maximum to the goodness of creatable 
worlds, God is impossible.
The argument has elicited a wide range of responses; but it is fair to say 
that most critics take issue with B, denying it for one reason or another. 
Principle B is a kind of “expression principle”4—it links a psychological 
state or character trait that comes in degrees, on the one hand, with its 
expression in behavior under idealized circumstances, on the other hand. 
Most critics of Rowe’s argument claim that, when faced with an endless 
sequence of better and better options, choosing a worse world than one 
could is compatible with moral unsurpassability. When circumstances 
present ever better options from which to choose (what Chris Tucker calls 
an “Ever Better Situation”5), the value of one’s choice will not precisely 
express the goodness of one’s motives or character.6
This criticism of B will seem intuitive to those already convinced, by 
similar examples, of the appropriateness of “satisficing”—choosing a 
good enough option when one could do better. Michael Slote famously 
argues for a “Satisficing Consequentialism” partly on this basis. He first 
points out that rationality seems not to be impugned by choosing a good 
enough option from an endless series of better and better options:
4Compare Morris’s use of the term “Expression Thesis” (“Perfection and Creation,” 242).
5Tucker, “Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization,” 130.
6Representatives include Morris, “Perfection and Creation,” 243–245; Howard-Snyder 
and Howard-Snyder, “How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World” and 
“The Real Problem of No Best World”; Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, 171–
173; and Langtry, God, the Best, and Evil, ch. 2. Norman Kretzmann foresaw Rowe’s argument, 
and made the same move (Kretzmann, “A Particular Problem of Creation,” 238). A different 
sort of challenge to principle B has been developed by Brian Leftow. He argues that even God 
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How do we react to fairy tales in which the hero or heroine, offered a sin-
gle wish, asks for a pot of gold, for a million (1900) dollars, or simply, for 
(enough money to enable) his family and himself to be comfortably well off 
for the rest of their lives? In each case the person asks for less than he might 
have asked for, but we are not typically struck by the thought that he was 
irrational to ask for less than he could have.7
Slote then draws a similar conclusion about the moral status of someone 
forced to choose among options that benefit others to higher and higher 
degrees, without limit:
[C]onsider a fairy-tale wish regarding people other than oneself. A warrior 
has fought meritoriously and died in a good cause, and the gods wish to 
grant him a single wish for those he leaves behind, before he enters Paradise 
and ceases to be concerned with his previous life. Presented with such an 
opportunity, may not the warrior wish for his family to be comfortably well 
off forever after? And will we from a common-sense standpoint consider 
him to have acted wrongly or non-benevolently towards his family because 
he (presumably knowingly) rejected an expectably better lot for them in fa-
vor of what was simply good enough? Surely not.8
As Chris Tucker has pointed out, Slote’s reaction is widely shared; 
satisficing in Ever Better Situations has seemed highly intuitive to many 
moral philosophers—so intuitive as to be “banal,” and hardly worthy of 
the name “satisficing.”9 According to Tucker, it should rather be thought 
of as a kind of “motivated submaximization”—a situation in which, while 
aiming at as much good as possible, one settles for less than one could 
because of “countervailing considerations.”10 Tucker argues that theists 
who reject B are merely committed “to the appropriateness of motivated 
submaximization,” which comes at little cost since it is “so popular and 
well supported in the mainstream literature.”11
I agree with Tucker and the rest of the critics of B, and will attempt to 
bolster confidence by telling a couple of stories. The stories raise prob-
lems for analogous expression principles that might be thought to govern 
other personal characteristics besides moral goodness, benevolence, 
or purity of motivation. These morally charged character traits come in 
degrees because they depend upon psychological dispositions that also 
come in degrees—e.g., some people are more willing to make personal 
sacrifices for the sake of others in need, and qualify as more benevolent 
in virtue of that fact. The hypothesis that moral perfection is a coherent 
might be subject to moral luck, and wind up with a less good world for reasons that do not 
impugn God’s character (I say “largely,” because the argument includes several dilemmas, 
and not all the horns ascribe moral luck to God); see Leftow, “No Best World: Moral Luck” 
and “No Best World: Creaturely Freedom.”
7Slote, “Satisficing Consequentialism,” 147.
8Slote, “Satisficing Consequentialism,” 150–151. 
9Tucker, “Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization,” 130.
10Tucker, “Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization,” 130.
11Tucker, “Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization,” 138.
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notion depends upon the idea that there is at least one combination of 
these psychological dispositions that makes for maximal moral goodness. 
But should we expect these kinds of gradable psychological traits to be 
capable of full expression, even in ideal circumstances, when there are in-
finitely many better and better options available to an agent, with no best?
Reflection upon a couple of other gradable psychological states strongly 
suggests a negative answer. Certainty and desire come in degrees, and 
they may well have upper limits—at least, there may be highest degrees of 
certainty or desire available to creatures like us. We naturally expect that, 
in ideal circumstances, different degrees of certainty and desire would be 
expressed in different kinds of behavior. But when agents are supposed 
to be capable of contemplating infinitely many acts, or even indefinitely 
many acts, B-like principles for the expression of certainty and desire lead 
to analogues of Rowe’s argument. The results are highly counterintuitive, 
and this supports the general claim that simple expression principles, like 
B, should be expected to fail in cases relevantly like an Ever Better Situation.
Expression Principle for Certainty
I begin with the failure of an expression principle for certainty—a prin-
ciple that seems very plausible, until one considers the infinite case.
In general, the amount of money one is willing to bet reflects one’s cer-
tainty about the outcome. If an ideal gambler is in ideal circumstances—she 
is clear-headed, not making any mathematical or logical mistakes, acting 
entirely out of self-interest—her willingness to risk larger and larger sums 
should be expected to go up with her degree of certainty. So this expres-
sion principle about idealized gamblers seems, prima facie, reasonable:
B*: If an ideal gambler in ideal circumstances bets n dollars on a given 
outcome, but could have bet more than n dollars, then it is possible 
for the gambler to be more certain about that outcome.
Suppose there is a cosmic lender, Donna, who has convinced an ideal 
gambler, John, that, for any sum of money he can think of, she will give 
him that much money to bet on the outcome of a game. Donna plays 
the role of “The Lender,” a role that requires convincing any reasonable 
person that you have any amount of money the person can name.
Now suppose the game is this: there is a mathematically challenged 
rich man, Donald, whom the gambler believes to be as rich as Donna; and 
Donald bets John that 2 + 2 = 5. John is absolutely certain, as certain as it is 
possible for John to be of anything, that Donald is wrong about this. John 
has several thousand dollars to bet, but—because the situation is an ideal 
one, in which John is purely self-interested, and there are no other relevant 
considerations—John would bet anything he can get his hands on that 
Donald is wrong. However, Donna, the Lender, is nowhere to be found. 
So John bets Donald $1000 that 2 + 2 is not 5. Donald says, “That’s not very 
much. Let’s make this bet interesting; for any amount of money you can 
name, I’ll bet you that much money that I’m right and you’re wrong.” 
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Suddenly, Donna enters the room, and offers to cover John’s bet. John, 
relieved, chooses the first astronomical amount he can think of—three 
hundred billion dollars—although John could easily have chosen a larger 
number. While selecting this number, John does not lose any confidence 
in his knowledge of mathematical facts; he knows he must choose some 
amount, and that his choice will have to be to some degree arbitrary—not 
correlated precisely with his rational expectations. John wins the bet, and 
becomes fabulously wealthy.
If B* is true, there is a deep incoherence in this story, one that can be 
revealed by an argument that mirrors Rowe’s:
1*. For any x and W: if x is an ideal gambler in W and x borrows n dol-
lars from the Lender to bet on an outcome, then x could have bet 
more on that outcome—for example, x could have asked for n + 1 
dollars.
2*. For any x and W: if x, in W, is an ideal gambler who could have bet 
more on an outcome, then W is a possible world in which x is not 
as certain of the outcome as x could have been. [B*]
3*. So, for any x and W: if x is an ideal gambler in W and x borrows n 
dollars from the Lender to bet on an outcome; then W is a world in 
which x is not as certain of the outcome as x could have been. [1* & 
2*]
4*. In W* (the world of this story), John is an ideal gambler who is as 
certain of the outcome as he could be of anything—there is no pos-
sible world in which John is more certain about something.
5*. So, for any W: if W is a world in which John borrows n dollars from 
the Lender to bet on a certain outcome, then John is not absolutely 
certain that the outcome will occur (John is not as certain as he is in 
W*). [From 3* & 4*]
6*. But W* is a world in which John borrows n dollars from the Lender 
to bet on a certain outcome (that is part of the story).
 CONTRADICTION: In W*, John is not as certain about the out-
come as John is in W*.
What this argument shows is that, if B* is true, the conclusion of the story 
about John, Donald, and the Lender was deeply incoherent. Once Donna 
offered to cover John’s bet, the story could only be continued in one way, 
so long as John remains an ideal gambler in ideal circumstances (that is, 
John does not become confused or distracted, and John does not cease 
to be purely self-interested): “John’s absolute certainty about the simplest 
mathematical facts faded away in the presence of the Lender.” But there 
seems nothing inconsistent in finishing the story with John’s making an 
arbitrary choice, and denying that John’s certainty changes.
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Slote’s first fairy-tale moral seems exactly right: When it is better to 
choose arbitrarily among excellent options rather than not to choose at all, 
the rational person will choose arbitrarily. There might be some amounts 
that it would be positively crazy for John to choose, and some that are bor-
derline; but as long as there are many that are perfectly excellent, choosing 
one when a better is available is consistent with John’s being an ideal gam-
bler—he is not making any mathematical or logical errors, he is driven 
only by self-interest.12 And the kind of information gained when Donna 
enters the room, which has nothing to do with whether two and two make 
five, should have no effect upon John’s level of certainty.
Surely the better thing to say is that 2* and its justification, B*, the 
certainty analogue of B, should not be expected to hold when a gambler 
has infinitely (really, in this case, indefinitely) many options from which 
to choose, and no best option. When confronted by infinitely many (or 
indefinitely many) choices of a sort that normally can be counted upon 
to precisely reflect or express an agent’s level of certainty, one should no 
longer expect the choice to express the agent’s certainty.
Expression Principle for Desire
Here is a similar case in which a different sort of mental state—degree of 
desire to reach some place—might be expected to be expressed by a dif-
ferent kind of action—the speed with which one travels. On the face of it, 
an analogue expression principle is plausible (once the case is set up just 
right): degree of desire should, other things being equal, be expressed in 
the speed with which one satisfies the desire. But, in the infinite or indef-
inite case, one should no longer expect the relevant expression principle 
to hold.
Suppose that an ideal traveler—someone who only cares about the time 
it takes to get to her destination, and who makes no logical mistakes in 
her practical reasoning—wants to reach New York quickly, and wants this 
as much as she could want anything. Since she wants nothing else that 
could conflict with this desire, she will use the fastest method, and spare 
no expense. Someone who claims to be in this situation, but who takes the 
Queen Elizabeth or makes a stopover in Boston to see relatives, does not 
12Tucker cites several affirmations of the rationality of this sort of “first pass satisficing” 
(i.e., the rationality, in Ever Better Situations, of choosing an arbitrary but highly prized out-
come), including Pollock, “How Do You Maximize Expectation Value?,” 417–418; Schmidtz, 
“Satisficing as a Humanly Rational Strategy,” 41–44; and Slote, Beyond Optimizing, 110–123 
(“Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization,” 130). I would add that even James Dreier, 
who explicitly argues against the idea that the norms of rationality permit satisficing (“Why 
Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t”), would allow that John’s 
choosing an arbitrary amount to bet is more rational than John’s not betting at all. Dreier is 
inclined to say that John faces a rational dilemma: whatever John bets, he can be faulted from 
the standpoint of practical reason; he is not perfectly rational (personal communication). As 
Daniel Rubio has pointed out to me, this conclusion does not save an expression principle 
such as (B*), which is not about whether satisficing in Ever Better Situations is compatible 
with being certain and being perfect rational, but rather whether it is compatible with being 
certain and being entirely self-interested and logically infallible. 
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after all have this maximal desire to get to New York quickly, or else she is 
not an ideal traveler. This suggests an expression principle:
B**: If an ideal traveler is willing to settle for a trip to her goal at a cer-
tain number of meters-per-second, but could have chosen a faster 
speed, then it is possible for her to have a stronger desire to reach 
her goal.
Now take someone who really does have this extreme desire, someone 
who desires to reach a loved one in New York City as much as she could 
want anything; and convince her that the following is true:
Our scientists have created a teletransporter that cannot get you to New 
York at the speed of light, but it can get you there at any speed you 
choose short of that. The speed of light in a vacuum is 299,792,458 me-
ters per second. You can choose 299,792,457 meters and 9 decimeters per 
second, or 299,792,457 meters and 99 centimeters, or 299,792,457 meters 
and 999 millimeters or. . . . Now tell us how fast you want to get there.
Of course normal people will think that such tiny differences in speed 
could never matter to them or their loved ones, since the differences could 
never be noticed by themselves or their friends in New York. But if our 
idealized agent believes, rightly or wrongly, that any fraction of a second 
could be detected by the person she is trying to reach, and that every frac-
tion of a second apart is a sad one for that person, then “it doesn’t matter” 
is not an option. For any “.999999 . . . ” chosen, something faster could 
have been chosen.
Obviously, a parallel argument could be constructed that would show 
the incoherence of our ideal agent retaining her degree of desire when 
forced to choose an arbitrary but extremely high speed. (Constructing 
the argument is left as the proverbial exercise for the reader.) The result 
seems as unsatisfactory as in the case of certainty. Would the fact that she is 
confronted with this kind of choice necessarily alter her mental states, ren-
dering her either less anxious to get to New York or else causing her to make 
some kind of serious mistake in her practical reasoning?13 The first option 
does not seem psychologically inevitable; and the second option seems to 
be an overly harsh judgment. So the expression principle B**, which seems 
safe enough in the finite case, should not be expected to remain true when 
an agent believes she is confronted with an Ever Better Situation.
Conclusions
The engine behind Rowe’s argument is principle B, an expression prin-
ciple. And reflection upon the application of expression principles to 
13As in the parallel argument about certainty, some will say that the traveler in this Ever 
Better Situation is being perfectly rational, so long as she chooses a speed that is fast enough. 
Others will say that, although it would be positively irrational to choose not to go at all 
(so it is rationally required to choose some speed or other), nevertheless, whatever speed is 
chosen, the ideal traveler is open to some kind of rational criticism. (See n. 12 above.)
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beings facing an infinite (or indefinite) range of options strongly suggests 
their invalidity in such cases. The possibility of a maximum of some psy-
chological characteristic—certainty, desire, moral goodness, love; or, for 
that matter, uncertainty, distaste, moral turpitude, hatred—should not be 
undermined by the possibility of circumstances arising in which the de-
gree of the characteristic cannot be fully expressed. If some such virtues, 
vices, and attitudes admit of highest possible degrees (even if that max-
imum is relative to a kind of creature), it should be possible for an agent 
to have the highest degree, face an infinite (or indefinite) range of options, 




Dreier, James. 2004. “Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing 
Doesn’t.” In Satisficing and Maximizing, edited by Michael Byron (Cambridge 
University Press), 131–154. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617058.008
Grover, Stephen. 1988. “Why Only the Best Is Good Enough.” Analysis 48: 224.
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/48.4.224
Hasker, William. 2004. Providence, Evil and the Openness of God (Routledge).
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Frances Howard-Snyder. 1994. “How an Unsurpass-
able Being Can Create a Surpassable World.” Faith and Philosophy 11: 260–268.
https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil199411222
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Frances Howard-Snyder. 1996. “The Real Problem of 
No Best World.” Faith and Philosophy 13: 422–425.
https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil199613333
Kretzmann, Norman. 1990. “A Particular Problem of Creation.” In Being and Good-
ness, edited by Scott MacDonald (Cornell University Press), 208–249.
Langtry, Bruce. 2008. God, the Best, and Evil (Oxford University Press).
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238798.001.0001
Leftow, Brian. 2005a. “No Best World: Creaturely Freedom.” Religious Studies 41: 
269–285. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412505007778
Leftow, Brian. 2005b. “No Best World: Moral Luck.” Religious Studies 41: 165–181.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412505007584
Morris, Thomas V. 1993. “Perfection and Creation.” In Reasoned Faith, edited by 
Eleonore Stump (Cornell University Press), 234–247.
14I have told these parallel stories about certainty and desire in many contexts, and 
learned a lot from the ensuing discussions. I thank participants in workshops at the École 
Normale Supérieure; the Baylor Summer Seminar at Columbia, Missouri; the Boston Uni-
versity Institute for Philosophy and Religion; Oxford University’s Samuel Butler Society; the 
God and Goodness workshop hosted by the Rutgers Center for the Philosophy of Religion; 
and “Quo Vadis, Metaphysics?” (a conference honoring Peter van Inwagen) in Warsaw, Po-
land. I am particularly grateful to Daniel Rubio and Jamie Dreier for some last-minute help 
with my criticism of (B*).
